सीबीआई ने आईआरएस अधिकारी समीर वानखेड़े और चार अन्य पर अभिनेता शाहरुख खान से 25 करोड़ रुपये की रिश्वत लेने का आरोप लगाया है। खबरों के मुताबिक, समीर ने 2021 के कथित ड्रग जब्ती मामले में अभिनेता के बेटे आर्यन खान की सहायता का अनुरोध किया। सीबीआई ने मुंबई, दिल्ली और कानपुर सहित अन्य में उनके 29 ठिकानों की भी तलाशी ली। वानखेड़े, NCB के दो पूर्व अधिकारी और कुछ निजी कर्मचारी, CBI के अनुसार, मांगे गए 25 करोड़ रिश्वत में से 25 लाख रुपये पहले ही वसूल कर चुके थे। वानखेड़े ने पहले नारकोटिक्स कंट्रोल ब्यूरो (NCB) के मुंबई ज़ोन प्रमुख के रूप में कार्य किया था, और क्रूज शिप ड्रग्स मामले में उनकी गिरफ्तारी से विवाद छिड़ गया था। एनसीबी में अपने कार्यकाल के दौरान वानखेड़े को कई आरोपों का सामना करना पड़ा, जिसके कारण उनका स्थानांतरण हुआ और उनके कुछ विवादास्पद मामलों की आंतरिक जांच का आदेश दिया गया। एनसीबी की एसआईटी (विशेष जांच दल), जिसने आर्यन खान मामले की फिर से जांच की, ने हाल ही में चार्जशीट दायर की, जिसमें आर्यन सहित 14 आरोपियों में से 6 को बरी कर दिया। एनसीबी ने “पर्याप्त सबूतों की कमी” के कारण आर्यन के नाम को मंजूरी दे दी थी। 3 अक्टूबर, 2021 को सबसे पहले आर्यन, उनके दोस्त अरबाज मर्चेंट और क्रूज गेस्ट मुनमुन धमेचा को गिरफ्तार किया गया था। बॉम्बे हाई कोर्ट ने उन्हें महीने के अंत में जमानत दे दी थी। हालांकि, अभिनेता के बेटे के पास कोई ड्रग्स नहीं मिला।आर्यन को धारा 27 के तहत ड्रग्स का सेवन करने की कोशिश, धारा 8 (सी) (कब्जा), धारा 28 (उकसाने), और धारा 29 (साजिश) के तहत गिरफ्तार किया गया था।

वरिष्ठ अधिवक्ता बनाने की प्रक्रिया हर साल की जानी चाहिए, व्यक्तिगत साक्षात्कार समग्र मूल्यांकन की अनुमति देता है: सुप्रीम कोर्ट शुक्रवार को सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने सुप्रीम कोर्ट और हाईकोर्ट में वरिष्ठ अधिवक्ताओं के पदनाम की व्यवस्था में सुधार पर विस्तृत फैसला सुनाया। जस्टिस एसके कौल, जस्टिस अहसानुद्दीन अमानुल्लाह और जस्टिस अरविंद कुमार की खंडपीठ ने सुश्री इंदिरा जय सिंह बनाम सुप्रीम कोर्ट ऑफ इंडिया (एम.ए. संख्या 709/2022, 1502/2020) के मामले में फैसला सुनाया। सर्वोच्च न्यायालय ने पदनाम के विभिन्न पहलुओं को कवर किया है जैसे कि गुप्त मतदान द्वारा मतदान, कट ऑफ मार्क्स, प्रकाशन के लिए अंक, रिपोर्ट किए गए और अप्रतिबंधित निर्णय, निशुल्क कार्य, कानून की विभिन्न शाखाओं के तहत एक आवेदक की डोमेन विशेषज्ञता, आयु, व्यक्तिगत साक्षात्कार और अन्य सामान्य पहलू। पृष्ठभूमि ​​भारत में वरिष्ठ अधिवक्ताओं का पदनाम असाधारण अधिवक्ताओं को दिया जाने वाला एक प्रतिष्ठित खिताब है, जिन्होंने कानूनी पेशे में महत्वपूर्ण योगदान दिया है। यह शीर्षक एक अधिवक्ता के क्षेत्र में खड़े होने और उपलब्धियों की पहचान के लिए दिया जाता है, जो उन्हें ऐसे व्यक्ति के रूप में अलग करता है जो ग्राहकों, न्यायपालिका और जनता को असाधारण सेवा प्रदान कर सकता है। वरिष्ठ अधिवक्ताओं को नामित करने की प्रणाली को चुनौती दी गई थी, जब सुश्री इंदिरा जयसिंह, जो स्वयं एक वरिष्ठ अधिवक्ता थीं, ने 2015 में एक रिट याचिका दायर की थी।इस चुनौती के जवाब में, सुप्रीम कोर्ट की तीन-न्यायाधीशों की पीठ ने 12 अक्टूबर, 2017 को एक विस्तृत निर्णय जारी किया। व्यक्तिगत साक्षात्कार अधिवक्ताओं के व्यक्तिगत साक्षात्कार पर, यह प्रस्तुत किया गया था कि यह बड़ी संख्या में उम्मीदवारों के साक्षात्कार के व्यावहारिक मुद्दे को ध्यान में रखते हुए पदनाम की प्रक्रिया में देरी करेगा। इसके अलावा, एक साक्षात्कार से बहुत कम उद्देश्य पूरा होगा क्योंकि उम्मीदवारों का पहले से ही न्यायालय के समक्ष उनकी उपस्थिति से मूल्यांकन किया जा रहा था। खंडपीठ ने कहा: हम उपरोक्त आलोचनाओं से अवगत हैं। हमारा मानना है कि एक साक्षात्कार प्रक्रिया उम्मीदवार की अधिक व्यक्तिगत और गहन परीक्षा की अनुमति देगी। एक साक्षात्कार अधिक समग्र मूल्यांकन को भी सक्षम बनाता है, विशेष रूप से वरिष्ठ अधिवक्ता पदनाम असाधारण अधिवक्ताओं को दिया जाने वाला सम्मान है। एक वरिष्ठ अधिवक्ता को एक निश्चित समय सीमा के भीतर बहुत स्पष्ट और सटीक होने की भी आवश्यकता होती है, जो ऐसे मूल्य हैं जिनका साक्षात्कार के दौरान आसानी से मूल्यांकन किया जा सकता है। इसी भावना से हमने साक्षात्कार प्रक्रिया को अधिक व्यावहारिक बनाने का प्रयास किया है। इस प्रकार, हमने एक निश्चित समय पर नामित किए जाने वाले वरिष्ठ अधिवक्ताओं की संख्या को ध्यान में रखते हुए साक्षात्कार की संख्या को स्थायी समिति द्वारा व्यवहार्य समझी गई उचित मात्रा तक सीमित कर दिया है। जैसा कि हमने नामित किए जाने वाले उम्मीदवारों की संख्या के संदर्भ में साक्षात्कार की संख्या को सीमित करके प्रक्रिया को सुव्यवस्थित किया है, हमारा मानना है कि एक सार्थक अभ्यास किया जा सकता है। इस प्रकार, हम इस श्रेणी के तहत दिए गए अंकों को कम करने या कम करने के लिए इच्छुक नहीं हैं, विशेष रूप से इस अभ्यास को और अधिक सार्थक बनाने के लिए वर्तमान आदेश द्वारा किए गए फाइन-ट्यूनिंग को देखते हुए। पदनाम प्रक्रिया हर साल न्यायालय ने नोट किया: वर्तमान में, 2018 के दिशानिर्देशों के अनुसार, पदनाम की प्रक्रिया वर्ष में दो बार अर्थात प्रत्येक वर्ष जनवरी और जुलाई के महीने में की जानी है। हालांकि, श्रीमती माधवी दीवान, एएसजी ने प्रस्तुत किया कि यदि उपरोक्त विस्तृत रूप में अभ्यास किया जाना है, तो प्रक्रिया को वर्ष में दो बार करना बहुत मुश्किल होगा। इस संबंध में कोर्ट ने कहा कि साल में कम से कम एक बार यह प्रक्रिया पूरी की जाए ताकि आवेदन जमा न हों। न्यायालय ने नोट किया: इस संबंध में, कुछ उच्च न्यायालयों से कुछ परेशान करने वाले उदाहरण सामने आए हैं जहां पदनाम का प्रयोग कई वर्षों से नहीं किया गया है। नतीजतन, मेधावी अधिवक्ता प्रासंगिक समय पर पदनाम के लिए विचार किए जाने के अवसर से चूक जाते हैं।

कंज्यूमर कोर्ट ने एयरपोर्ट को फ्लाइट में सीढ़ी चढ़ने पर रेन कवर नहीं देने पर यात्री को ₹16,000 का मुआवजा देने का आदेश दिया केरल की एक अदालत ने हाल ही में फैसला सुनाया कि कोचीन इंटरनेशनल एयरपोर्ट लिमिटेड (CIAL) को उड़ान भरने के लिए सीढ़ी पर रेन कवर उपलब्ध नहीं कराने के लिए यात्री को ₹16,000 का मुआवजा देना होगा।यात्री बारिश में भीग गया जिससे शारीरिक परेशानी और मानसिक पीड़ा हुई। जिला उपभोक्ता निवारण आयोग ने माना कि सीआईएएल द्वारा आरोप का खंडन करने के लिए सीसीटीवी फुटेज प्रदान करने में विफलता ने यात्री के दावे को मजबूत किया। आयोग ने कहा कि ग्राहक कल्याण के प्रति लाभ कमाने वाली संस्थाओं द्वारा इस तरह की उदासीनता अस्वीकार्य है, और सीआईएएल को कार्यवाही की लागत के लिए ₹8,000 का भुगतान करने का आदेश दिया। सीआईएएल की खराब सेवा के कई मामलों का सामना करने वाले एक फ्रीक्वेंट फ्लायर की शिकायत पर यह आदेश पारित किया गया। CIAL ने तर्क दिया कि शिकायत ने उपभोक्ता संरक्षण अधिनियम की आवश्यकताओं का पालन नहीं किया था, लेकिन आयोग द्वारा खारिज कर दिया गया था, जिसमें कहा गया था कि यात्री सुविधा एक भुगतान सेवा है।आयोग ने पाया कि सीआईएएल आरोपों को गलत साबित करने के लिए सीसीटीवी फुटेज उपलब्ध कराने में विफल रही, जो उसकी ओर से लापरवाही दर्शाता है। निर्णय ग्राहक कल्याण को प्राथमिकता देने और सेवा की कमियों को दूर करने के लिए लाभ कमाने वाली संस्थाओं की आवश्यकता को दर्शाता है। ऐसी संस्थाओं को शिकायत निवारण के लिए आयोगों से संपर्क करने वाले उपभोक्ताओं को जवाब देना चाहिए।

बैंकों से फास्टैग से एकत्रित धन पर ब्याज का भुगतान कि माँग वाली याचिका पर हाईकोर्ट ने केंद्र से जवाब मांगा दिल्ली उच्च न्यायालय ने फास्टैग जारी करने और कार्ड पर न्यूनतम शेष राशि की आवश्यकता के साथ बैंक द्वारा एकत्र किए गए धन पर अधिकारियों को ब्याज का भुगतान करने के लिए बैंकों को निर्देश देने की मांग वाली याचिका पर एनएचएआई और केंद्र से जवाब मांगा है। मुख्य न्यायाधीश सतीश चंद्र शर्मा और न्यायमूर्ति सुब्रमण्यम प्रसाद की पीठ ने भारतीय राष्ट्रीय राजमार्ग प्राधिकरण (NHAI) और सड़क परिवहन और राजमार्ग मंत्रालय (MoRT&H) को एक आवेदन पर नोटिस जारी किया, जिसमें कहा गया है कि FASTag जारी करने से हजारों करोड़ रुपये का नुकसान होता है। कम्यूटर समुदाय या एनएचएआई या एमओआरटीएंडएच को बिना किसी समान लाभ के बैंकिंग प्रणाली में रुपये का प्रवेश हुआ है। अदालत ने अधिकारियों को आवेदन पर अपना जवाब दाखिल करने के लिए चार सप्ताह का समय दिया और मामले को 10 अगस्त को आगे की सुनवाई के लिए सूचीबद्ध किया। आवेदन एक लंबित याचिका में दायर किया गया था जो उस नियम को चुनौती देता है जो बिना फास्टैग वाले वाहनों को टोल टैक्स का दोगुना भुगतान करने के लिए मजबूर करता है। याचिका में कहा गया है कि यह नियम भेदभावपूर्ण, मनमाना और जनहित के खिलाफ है क्योंकि यह एनएचएआई को नकद भुगतान करने पर दोगुनी दर से टोल वसूलने का अधिकार देता है। याचिकाकर्ता रविंदर त्यागी का प्रतिनिधित्व अधिवक्ता प्रवीण अग्रवाल ने किया, उन्होंने आवेदन में कहा कि फास्टैग सुविधा की शुरुआत के साथ 30,000 करोड़ रुपये से अधिक की राशि बैंकिंग प्रणाली में आ गई है। याचिका में कहा गया है कि अगर इस आंकड़े पर 8.25 प्रतिशत सालाना की सावधि जमा दर लागू की जाती है, तो हर साल NHAI या MoRT&H को 2,000 करोड़ रुपये से अधिक का लाभ होगा। “वर्तमान में इस पैसे का उपयोग बैंकों/वित्तीय संस्थानों द्वारा नि: शुल्क और उत्तरदाताओं (NHAI और MoRT&H) की कीमत पर किया जा रहा है। इस पैसे का ब्याज या तो NHAI/MoRTH या यात्रियों का है और इसे इसमें खर्च किया जाना चाहिए। सड़क/राजमार्ग/यात्रियों के लाभ के आगे के विकास,” यह कहा। आवेदन में फास्टैग के ब्याज से प्राप्त आय से ‘यात्री कल्याण कोष’ के नाम से एक अलग कोष बनाने के लिए अधिकारियों को निर्देश देने की भी मांग की गई है।

सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने बिहार में जाति सर्वेक्षण रोकने के पटना हाई कोर्ट के आदेश पर रोक लगाने से किया इनकार.. सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने गुरुवार को पटना हाई कोर्ट के उस आदेश पर रोक लगाने से इनकार कर दिया, जिसमें बिहार सरकार द्वारा किए जा रहे जाति सर्वेक्षण पर रोक लगा दी गई थी. जस्टिस अभय एस ओका और राजेश बिंदल की पीठ ने कहा कि यह जांच करनी होगी कि क्या किया जा रहा अभ्यास सर्वेक्षण की आड़ में जनगणना है।पीठ ने कहा, “हम यह स्पष्ट कर रहे हैं, यह ऐसा मामला नहीं है जहां हम आपको अंतरिम राहत दे सकते हैं।” शीर्ष अदालत ने कहा कि उच्च न्यायालय ने मुख्य याचिका की सुनवाई तीन जुलाई के लिए स्थगित कर दी है।“हम निर्देश देते हैं कि इस याचिका को 14 जुलाई को सूचीबद्ध किया जाए। यदि किसी कारण से, रिट याचिका की सुनवाई अगली तारीख से पहले शुरू नहीं होती है, तो हम याचिकाकर्ता (बिहार) के वरिष्ठ वकील द्वारा आगे की दलीलें सुनेंगे।” बेंच ने कहा। उच्च न्यायालय के चार मई के आदेश के खिलाफ शीर्ष अदालत में दायर एक अपील में बिहार सरकार ने कहा था कि रोक लगाने से पूरी कवायद पर प्रतिकूल प्रभाव पड़ेगा।राज्य सरकार ने कहा कि जाति आधारित डेटा का संग्रह संविधान के अनुच्छेद 15 और 16 के तहत एक संवैधानिक आदेश है। बिहार में जाति सर्वेक्षण का पहला दौर 7 से 21 जनवरी के बीच आयोजित किया गया था। दूसरा दौर 15 अप्रैल को शुरू हुआ था और 15 मई तक जारी रहने वाला था।

दिल्ली उच्च न्यायालय ने सोमवार को ब्रिटिश ब्रॉडकास्टिंग कॉरपोरेशन (बीबीसी) को एक एनजीओ द्वारा दायर मानहानि के मुकदमे पर समन जारी किया, जिसमें दावा किया गया था कि इसकी डॉक्यूमेंट्री ने भारत, इसकी न्यायपालिका और प्रधान मंत्री नरेंद्र मोदी की प्रतिष्ठा पर धब्बा लगाया है। बीबीसी (यूके) के अलावा, जस्टिस सचिन दत्ता ने बीबीसी (इंडिया) को भी नोटिस जारी कर गुजरात स्थित एनजीओ जस्टिस फॉर ट्रायल द्वारा दायर याचिका पर प्रतिक्रिया मांगी है। याचिका में कहा गया है कि बीबीसी (भारत) स्थानीय संचालन कार्यालय है और बीबीसी (यूके) ने वृत्तचित्र – “इंडिया: द मोदी क्वेश्चन” जारी किया है – जिसमें दो एपिसोड हैं। एनजीओ की ओर से पेश हुए वरिष्ठ अधिवक्ता हरीश साल्वे ने कहा कि बीबीसी के खिलाफ मानहानि का मुकदमा उस वृत्तचित्र के संबंध में है जिसने भारत और न्यायपालिका सहित पूरी प्रणाली को “बदनाम” किया है। उन्होंने दलील दी कि डॉक्यूमेंट्री में प्रधानमंत्री के खिलाफ भी आक्षेप लगाया गया है।वादी की ओर से यह तर्क दिया गया था कि वृत्तचित्र मानहानिकारक आरोप लगाता है और देश की प्रतिष्ठा पर कलंक लगाता है। उच्च न्यायालय ने कहा, “प्रतिवादियों को सभी स्वीकार्य तरीकों से नोटिस जारी करें” और इसे 15 सितंबर को आगे की सुनवाई के लिए सूचीबद्ध किया।

Case Title: Budhiarin Bai Vs. State of Chhattisgarh Bench: Justices Ajay Rastogi and Ct. Ravi Kumar Citation: Criminal Appeal No(s). 1218 of 2022 The Supreme Court on Wednesday reduced the sentence of the accused, considering the age of the poor illiterate woman accused in the NDPS case. Justice Ajay Rastogi and Justice C.T. Ravikumar said that “there should be no leniency in such cases, especially, when the offense has been proved beyond doubt and the conviction has been upheld by the High Court under Section 20(b)(ii)(c) of the NDPS Act. Are. , In this case, the appellant is a poor illiterate woman and a senior citizen at the time of the alleged incident, on whom commercial quantity of illegal 'Ganja' (Bhang) of 05 quintals and 21.5 kgs was found along with her two children for which Section of NDPS Act 20(b)(ii)(c) was charged. The other co-accused were charged under Section 27A of the NDPS Act of delivering illegal cannabis to a house which was in the possession of the accused-appellant and thereby facilitated the smuggling of cannabis by the appellant and his two children . The Trial Court convicted the appellant of the offense under section 20(b)(ii)(c) of the NDPS Act and acquitted the other four persons of all charges and sentenced the appellant to rigorous imprisonment for 15 years and fine. The High Court upheld the conviction of the appellant. The appeal has been filed against the judgment and order upholding the conviction of the appellant for the offense under section 20 (b) (ii) (c) of the NDPS Act. The issue of consideration before the bench was: Whether the appellant is guilty of an offense under section 20(b)(ii)(c) of the NDPS Act? The Supreme Court held that neither the trial court nor the High Court has denied that the woman was illiterate and a senior citizen, but completely ignorant of the law, with two grown children, at any time in her lifetime as a criminal. The previous background of the case was not involved. The bench observed that “it is a danger to the society; No leniency should be shown towards the accused persons found guilty under the NDPS Act. But upholding the same, this Court cannot be ignorant of other facts and circumstances as inferred in the present case that an old illiterate woman of rural background, who was a senior citizen at the time of the alleged incident, was residing in that house. . Her husband and two elder children who may be in trafficking, but the prosecution failed to investigate and take into account the procedural compliance required under sections 42, 50 and 55 of the NDPS Act, convicted the appellant for the reason that he was living in that house but at the same time completely ignored the fact that other co-accused were also living in the same house and what was their business, and who were they who were involved in trafficking and supplied supplies. psychotropic substances, the prosecution never cared to investigate. , In view of the above, the Supreme Court, after considering the old age of the appellant, who is a poor illiterate woman who is completely unaware of the consequences, reduced the sentence to 12 years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1 Lac.

Case Title: Khema @ Khem Chandra Adi Vs State of Uttar Pradesh Bench: Justice B.R. Gavai and Pamighanatam Sri Narasimha: Citation: Criminal Appeal No. 2022 of 1200 1202 The Supreme Court on Wednesday said that failure to examine independent witnesses leads to adverse findings against the prosecution. Justice B.R. Gavai and Pamighantham Sri Narasimha said that “though independent witnesses were available, the prosecution has failed to examine them. This is a matter in which the appellants are entitled to benefit of doubt." In this case two daughters of the deceased Prakash were to be married. On the wedding day, all the accused started assaulting the deceased Prakash and threw him on the brick road. To save the life of the deceased Prakash's brother Inder (PW2), his sister and his wife came forward. An FIR was registered against the accused persons under sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 302 and 506 of the IPC. The trial court convicted the appellants. The appellants filed an appeal before the High Court, which was also dismissed. The counsel for the appellants Shri Rajul Bhargava submitted that the prosecution has tried to suppress the actual origin of the incident. It was argued that though independent witnesses were available, the prosecution has failed to examine them and as such, an unfavorable inference needs to be drawn against the prosecution. State counsel Ms. Garima Prasad submitted that merely because (PW1) and (PW2) are relatives of the deceased, it cannot be a ground to reject their testimony. The issue of consideration before the bench was: Can the appellants be convicted under sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 302 and 506 of the IPC? The Supreme Court observed that the lower court has also come to the conclusion that Omveer (PW1) Could not witness the incident. There is no doubt that Inder (PW2) is an injured witness and hence, his testimony cannot be taken lightly. The bench said that the testimony of Inder (PW2) would fall under the third category, i.e. his evidence can be said to be "neither wholly credible nor wholly unreliable". In such a situation it will be necessary that there is some confirmation in the testimony of his eyes. The Supreme Court said that the trial court and the high court have failed to consider the significant discrepancies and discrepancies in the evidence of prosecution witnesses. The bench said though independent witnesses were available, the prosecution has failed to examine them. This is a case in which the appellants are entitled to benefit of doubt. In view of the above, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment passed by the High Court.

Case Title: J.J. Vedhasingh vs. R.M. Govindan and others. Bench: Justice S Abdul Nazeer and Justice J.K. Maheshwari Citation: Originated from SLP (Crl.) No. 2864 of 2019 The Supreme Court on Thursday referred the matter to a larger bench to decide whether an accused can be tried under the NI Act as well as the IPC, irrespective of prior conviction or acquittal. Is. Justice S Abdul Nazeer and Justice J.K. Maheshwari Madras were dealing with an appeal filed against the order passed by the High Court, whereby the High Court allowed the criminal petition filed by respondents no. 1 to 4 and quashed the proceedings under sections 120B, 406, 420 and 34 IPC. Gave. In this case, the appellant was working as a civil engineer in Saudi Arabia. On his return to India in the year 2011, he purchased a site from Respondent No. 2, who is the father of Respondent No. 1 in Coimbatore. The appellant made an investment but neither profit was shared nor any piece of land was given to the appellant. Respondent No. 1 handed over a check in lieu of payment of principal and interest. The said check got dishonored on the presentation of the bank due to insufficient funds. A demand notice was issued by the appellant and a complaint was lodged under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The defendants filed a petition before the Madras High Court to quash the proceedings. Accepting the said petition, the High Court quashed the proceedings. Counsel for the appellants relied on the case of Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel v State of Gujarat and others, where it was held that in the offense under section 138 of the NI Act, cause need not be proved, though the offense under section 420, fraudulent and is relevant to prove dishonest intent i.e. mains re. The counsel for the defendants relied upon the case of Kolla Veera Raghava Rao Vs. Gorantla Venkateswara Rao & Anr, where it was held that if the offenses are different and the facts are the same, the prosecution under Section 420 of the IPC should be given under Section 300(1) of CrPC. ) has been completely stopped. To avoid any further confusion and to maintain continuity, the Supreme Court referred some issues for decision by the larger Bench: (1) Whether the correct law has been laid down in the case of Kolla Veera Raghava Rao? either The view taken in the case of Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel which is the latter and conflicting, determines the correct proposition of law? (2) Whether the accused on the same set of charges of fact can be prosecuted for an offense under the NI Act which is a special Act and also for offenses under IPC unaffected by prior conviction or acquittal and section 300(1) ) Will the CrPC be attracted to such a test? The bench observed that the decisions based on learned counsel for both the sides are in conflict with each other on the legal issue. Keeping the above in view, the Supreme Court framed certain questions to be answered by the larger Bench.

Case Title: XYZ Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others Bench: Justices Dhananjay Y Chandrachud and JB Pardiwala Case No: Criminal Appeal No. 1184 of 2022 Recently, the Supreme Court ruled that the police should not create hurdles by refusing to register FIRs despite receiving complaints of sexual harassment. A bench of Justice Dhananjay Y Chandrachud and Justice JB Pardiwala said, “It is important for all courts to be aware of the fact that the legal process for victims of sexual harassment and assault becomes even more difficult for the complainants, who Struggling with trauma and social shame due to potentially unfair stigma." In this case the appellant was working as a yoga instructor in Lakshmibai National Institute of Physical Education, Gwalior. The second respondent, at the time, was the Vice Chancellor of the Institute. The appellant alleges that the second respondent touched her inappropriately in the institution, upon which she dissociated herself and shouted at her. An FIR was registered against the respondent. The appellant moved the Madhya Pradesh High Court with a complaint that no investigation was being conducted into his allegations, which were to be investigated under the provisions of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Protection and Redressal) Act, 2013. An appeal has been filed against the decision of a single judge in the Gwalior Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, dismissing an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The issue of consideration before the bench was: The bench said that it is the duty of the police to register an FIR whenever there is any cognizable offense in the complaint. The Supreme Court observed that “the inaction of the police in this matter is most unfortunate. It is the duty of every police officer to do his work with public sentiment. The police should be aware of the fact that they are usually the first point of contact for the victim or complainant of a crime. They should abide by the law and enable smooth registration of FIRs. Needless to say, he should treat all members of the public in a fair and impartial manner. This is even more necessary in cases of sexual harassment or violence, where the victims (who are usually women) face great social stigma while trying to file a complaint.” The bench said the courts should endeavor to ensure that the process of trying to bring the alleged perpetrators to justice is not difficult for the victims. Victims should not wander from door to door just to register complaint and initiate investigation, especially when their complaint constitutes a prima facie cognizable offence. In view of the above, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal.

In pursuance of the assurance given before the Supreme Court, the Bar Council of India today published its syllabus for the upcoming All India Bar Examination. The updated syllabus can be read on the website of Bar Council of India (http://www.barcouncilofindia.org/syllabus-for-all-india-bar-exam-xvii/). It may be noted that the syllabus for AIBE 17 remains unchanged when compared with the syllabus for AIBE 16.

Case Title: Ajola Devi & Ors. v. Jharkhand State Bench: Justice M.R. Shah and B.V. Nagaratna Citation: Originating from SLP (Crl.) No. 4221 of 2022 A strong message should be sent to the society that the person committing the crime of dowry death will be dealt with strictly - Supreme Court refuses to reduce the punishment Recently, the Supreme Court said that a strong message should be sent to the society that a person who commits dowry death and/or an offense under the Dowry Prohibition Act will be dealt with strictly. A bench of Justices MR Shah and BV Nagarathnaal was considering a petition challenging the judgment passed by the High Court where the appellants were held guilty under Section 304B read with Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Is. In this case the appellant/accused – father-in-law and father-in-law of the deceased were convicted of dowry death. The demand for dowry has been substantiated and proved by the prosecution. The deceased died within a year of marriage. The appellants were convicted for the offenses under section 304B read with section 201 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was prayed on behalf of the appellants that in view of the age of the accused, less punishment should be given. The learned Trial Court sentenced him to 10 years imprisonment which was upheld by the High Court. The issue of consideration before the bench was: Can the guilty be given less punishment under section 201 read with section 304 of IPC? The bench observed that the legislative intention of insertion of section 304B was to forcefully curb the menace of dowry death. In dealing with matters under section 304B, such legislative intent should be taken into account. Offense under section 304B - The offense of dowry death is an offense against the society. Such crimes have a deep impact on the society. The Supreme Court said that "a strong message should go to the society that a person who commits dowry death and/or an offense under the Dowry Prohibition Act will be dealt with strictly. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, imposition of RI of 10 years only cannot be said to be disproportionate to the offense committed." The bench observed that both the learned trial court as well as the high court have upheld the accused for the above offenses. In view of the above, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.

The husband said that he has become a monk, yet the Supreme Court refused to accept the petition for divorce? know why Recently, the Supreme Court overturned the divorce of husband and wife who have been living separately for 18 years. On the request of the husband, the High Court granted the divorce. However, the wife refused to get a divorce. She appealed to the Supreme Court, which overturned the divorce decision. The husband had argued for divorce, claiming that he had become a hermit and was no longer involved in household life. According to the Supreme Court, sometimes it becomes more important for a woman to get married. She can live her life with the help of her vermilion even if she is separated from her husband. A bench of Justices UU Lalit and S Ravindra Bhatt also observed that it may be impossible for a couple now living separately for 18 years to reconcile. However, because of the way society treats women and because it is important for the woman herself that she remains married, the couple's divorce is annulled. The woman's husband is a resident of Bhind in Madhya Pradesh. The husband had earlier filed for divorce in the family court. It was claimed that his wife had left him and was living separately from him. The wife was opposing the divorce. In 2008, the family court rejected the divorce application. After that the husband went to the Madhya Pradesh High Court. He filed a petition in the Gwalior Bench for divorce. The High Court had approved the divorce in 2014. Also ordered the husband to give Rs 5 lakh to the wife. The wife appealed against this decision in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court asked the High Court to reconsider its decision in 2017, but the High Court granted divorce for the second time. Thereafter, the Supreme Court heard the matter. The husband's argument for divorce was given on his behalf in the court, which said that he has now become a monk. He has surrendered everything. According to the Supreme Court, if the husband has become a monk, it does not matter whether the marriage is annulled or restored. Further, the bench said that the amount given by the husband to the woman after the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court will not be taken from her.

Today is a historic day in the Supreme Court - for the first time there will be a live telecast of the court proceedings Friday 26 August 2022 is a historic day in the history of the Supreme Court, as the court proceedings will be telecast live for the first time. A notice issued on Friday morning said: Please note that on the retirement of Hon'ble Chief Justice of India, the proceedings of Hon'ble Chief Justice's Court i.e. Ceremony Bench on 26th August, 2022, 10:30 AM will be livestreamed through webcast portal of NIC. Earlier the CJI had talked about starting live streaming of court proceedings especially the Supreme Court. Justice DY Chandrachud, who will become CJI at the end of November this year, has also been an active supporter of live streaming court proceedings.

Attorney General (AG) of India KK Venugopal argued before a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court on Tuesday that holding the All India Bar Examination (AIBE) before enrollment would be the most appropriate course of action [Anuj Agarwal v Union of India]. The submission was supported by senior advocate KV Viswanathan before a five-judge bench comprising Justices SK Kaul, Sanjiv Khanna, AS Oka, Vikram Nath, and JK Maheshwari. "The Act allows, as it stands now, to frame rules for the pre-enrollment examination. ", the senior counsel informed the court. On the Court's question about the impact of this approach on the judgment in V Sudeer v Bar Council of India, Viswanathan explained that the judgment in the matter was wrong. The pre-enrolment training for those entering the legal profession initiated by the Bar Council of India (BCI) was subject to challenge in this case. The Court had struck down the requirement of such training while observing, "These rules show that an enrolled advocate may practice as a full-fledged advocate, subject to the conditions laid down in these rules. His authority once granted cannot be restricted to his acting in court when he The State remains enrolled as an advocate on the roll. Therefore, it must be held that section 49(1)(ah) cannot uphold the impugned rules." During the hearing, Justice Kaul also recommended that the difficulty level of AIBE should be determined based on the number of advocates enrolled in the country. The judge underlined that the minimum standard required was set before being allowed to enroll and practice in the examination. Therefore, it must be of sufficient quality to determine the ability to practice. "How many lawyers do you need in the system? Ideally, if the job is done fairly, how many lawyers would be needed? Is there a need for such a liberal test?" He asked. He suggested that BCI conduct an analysis in this regard. When the issue of necessary training of young lawyers came to the fore, Viswanathan urged the court to consider training young lawyers. He suggested that this may be prescribed as one of the determining factors for lawyers for designation as seniors or for promotion to the Bench. The hearing will continue tomorrow. The Constitution Bench is hearing petitions challenging the validity of Rule 9 to 11 of the BCI Rules for violation of Sections 16, 24 and 30 of the Advocates Act and Articles 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. Rule 9 makes clearing AIBE a mandatory pre-condition for every practicing advocate. Rule 10 enables the BCI to conduct examinations and Rule 11 deals with the process of issuing certificates to practice. The questions referred for consideration of the Bench are: (1) Whether pre-enrollment training can be lawfully prescribed by the Bar Council of India in terms of the Bar Council of India Training Rules, 1995 made under section 24(3)(d) of the Advocates Act, 1961 and if so If so, what is the decision of this Court in V. Sudhir v. Bar Council of India et al. [(1999) 3 SCC 176)] Need to be reconsidered? (2) Can a pre-enrolment examination be prescribed by the Bar Council of India under the Advocates Act, 1961? (3) If questions numbers 1 and 2 are answered in the negative, whether the post-enrolment examination has been validly prescribed by the Bar Council of India in accordance with section 49(1)(ah) of the Advocates Act, 1961?

Case Title:-Bar Council of India v. Bonnie Foi Law College & Ors. [SLP(C) No. 22337/2008] and other connected matters A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court on Wednesday reserved judgment on a batch of petitions challenging the validity of the All-India Bar Examination. The five-judge Bench comprised Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Sanjiv Khanna, A.S. Oka, Vikram Nath, and J.K. Maheshwari. The lead petition is an appeal by special leave preferred by the Bar Council of India against a 2008 decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in a case dealing with the grant of affiliation and recognition to a law college. When the matter travelled to the apex court in appeal, a three-judge Bench headed by Chief Justice T.S. Thakur referred it to a Constitution Bench composed of five Judges for final determination of the "questions of considerable importance affecting the legal profession in general" that were raised before the apex court. It was during the pendency of this petition that the Bar Council of India, under the chairmanship of Senior Advocate Gopal Subramanium, had decided to conduct an all-India bar exam for the first time in 2010. After more than six years since the referral, and more than 14 years since the High Court ruling, the Constitution Bench is set to finally lay the controversy to rest. Yesterday, the Court heard the submissions of the Attorney-General of India and Senior Advocate K.K. Venugopal and the amicus curiae, Senior Advocate K.V. Vishwanathan. They called into question the correctness of the law laid down in V. Sudeer v. Bar Council of India & Anr. [(1999) 3 SCC 176] and pushed for a pre-enrolment examination. This argument seemed to find favour with the BCI Chairman, Manan Kumar Mishra, and Vice-Chairman, S. Prabakaran, who appeared on behalf of the statutory body. Picking up from where he had left off, Vishwanathan continued assailing the Supreme Court decision in V. Sudeer [(1999) 3 SCC 176]. He also questioned the soundness of the ruling in Indian Council of Legal Aid & Advice v. Bar Council of India [(1995) 1 SCC 732], on which the Sudeer Bench had placed reliance. Vishwanathan claimed that by virtue of these decisions, the Bar Council of India had been placed in a subservient position vis-à-vis the state bar councils. He urged that the paramountcy of the Bar Council needed to be preserved in light of the objectives and purposes of the Act, and the organisational framework created under it. An issue that persistently troubled the Bench, and was pointed out by both Justices Kaul and Khanna, was the implications of the deletion of Clause (d) in Section 24(1) as a result of which, the requirement imposed on a law graduate to undergo a course of "training in law and pass an examination after such training" was removed. Vishwanathan repelled the contention that this would abridge the powers of the Bar Council of India, strenuously arguing that such power could be located in Section 49(1)(ag), which had been kept intact. Therefore, the BCI, Vishwanathan reiterated, was competent to frame rules with respect to the prerequisites for persons who were entitled to practice law. Justice Kaul mused – "We are a constitutional court. We could interpret the constitutional question and be done with it. But we have to try and make the system workable…There is no perfect world, in an imperfect world, we have to decide how to reduce the imperfections." The Bench highlighted a number of issues that followed from the proposal to conduct a pre-enrolment examination, including, inter alia, the impact of "hundreds of people enrolling on the same day" after the results of the pre-enrolment examination on seniority, the prerequisites for applying for the examination, the competence of a law graduate to work and receive emoluments in the "interregnum period", the difference in the academic calendars of different colleges, and the lack of uniformity of fee structures. Justice Kaul observed – "Say, pre-enrolment exams take place. We don't want another litigation on how it will work out. Can there be some thought process, some uniformity in it?" Several suggestions were floated by Vishwanathan, such as making students eligible to take the examination in their final year to prevent loss of time and conducting the examination biannually to accommodate differences in academic calendars. Mishra reminded the Court that their purpose was to determine the competence of the Bar Council to conduct qualifying examinations. Justice Kaul pithily remarked – "Your argument is basically that you are free to hold pre or post-enrolment exams as you deem fit. And that you should be allowed to do that." In the course of his submissions, Vishwanathan also relied on Satish Kumar Sharma v. Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh [(2001) 2 SCC 365] and Pratap Chandra Mehta v. State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh [(2011) 9 SCC 573], which he asserted, recognised the overarching powers of the Bar Council. After the amicus curiae concluded, the Court heard the submissions made on behalf of the Bar Council of India. Mishra, after delineating the spheres in which the state bar councils and the Bar Council of India operated, urged that the power to make rules to prescribe prerequisites were conferred by Section 49. The conditions laid down in Section 24 indicated the eligibility simpliciter, which could further be qualified by the Bar Council in the exercise of its powers of, inter alia, superintendence and control. The Court also heard the arguments advanced by the counsel for the petitioners who endorsed the abolition of the post-enrolment bar examination. It was contended that the All India Bar Examination was unconstitutional and arbitrary. Advocate Kartik Seth, assailed the Bar Council on a number of counts, including the levy of an exorbitant fee for enrolment. Seth also reiterated Vishwanathan's recommendation of making final-year law students eligible to take the bar. Justice Kaul countered – "You have prepared well; you have done your homework. But we cannot take into consideration everything…This is a constitutional court. We cannot say charge Rs 3000 instead of Rs 3500. What you are giving, are suggestions. Let the Bar Council of India decide whether they would want to implement them."

On Wednesday Ministry of Law and Justice issued a notification about appointment of Attorney General of India. The Notification states: Honorable President is pleased to appoint Shri R. Venkataramani, Senior Advocate as Attorney General for India w.e.f. 1st October 2022. Mr. Venkatramani is a Supreme Court lawyer who has been practising for 45 years. In July 1977, he was admitted to the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu, and in 1979, he joined the chambers of Mr. P.P. Rao, Senior Advocate, Supreme Court. In 1982, he established an independent practise in the Supreme Court. In 1997, the Supreme Court of India appointed him as Senior Advocate. Appointed to the Law Commission of India in 2010, and reappointed for a second term in 2013. He has practised in many areas of law, including constitutional law, arbitration law, indirect tax law, corporate and securities law, environmental law, education law, land law, criminal law, human rights law, consumer law, and service law. Mr Venkatramani has appeared in the Supreme Court and High Courts on behalf of several state governments, universities, and central and state public sector undertakings. Between 2004 and 2010, he was a Special Senior Counsel for various departments of the Government of India in the Supreme Court and High Courts, and he also acted as Counsel for the Supreme Court in matters pertaining to the service conditions of Court employees. He has been actively involved in academic activities since 1988, beginning with his association with the National Law School of India University in Bangalore, and is currently involved in academic activities at several law schools.

POCSO: Can POCSO case be canceled due to agreement between accused and victim, Supreme Court agrees on investigation The Supreme Court has agreed to examine a legal question whether cases under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offenses (POCSO) Act can be quashed on the basis of an agreement between the accused and the victim. A bench of Justices Ajay Rastogi and AS Oka stayed the order of the Kerala High Court dated August 26, 2019, quashing the FIR lodged against the accused under the POCSO Act, 2012 on the basis of an agreement reached between the accused and the aggrieved parties. did. The apex court issued a notice on the appeal filed by the Kerala government against the order of the High Court. In this case, the accused, a teacher by profession, was booked under sections of the POCSO Act and the case pertained to sexual assault on a child in that institution by an educational institution or religious institution. The counsel for the petitioners informed that the FIR for offenses punishable under sections 9 (f) and 10 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offenses Act, 2012 at Malappuram police station has been quashed, the apex court said. It is not acceptable in view of the Court's decision to do so on the basis of the agreement being reached between the parties.

The Union Government has stated before the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Law and Justice that 79% of High Court judges appointed between 2018 and 2022 are from upper castes (general category). The Times of India and Indian Express has reported that between 2018 and December 19, 2022, 537 judges were appointed to various High Courts, with 79% from the General Category, 11% from Other Backward Classes, 2.6% from the minority, 2.8% from Scheduled Castes, and 1.3% from Scheduled Tribes. In 2021, Law Minister Kiren Rijiju told Parliament that the Central Government has been requesting Chief Justices across all High Courts to give due consideration to suitable candidates from Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes, minorities, and women when submitting proposals for judicial appointments.

Adani-Hindenburg: SC Orders Setting Up of Panel Headed by Ex-Judge AM Sapre To Probe Recent Share Crash The Supreme Court on Thursday ordered setting up of a six- member committee headed by former apex court judge A M Sapre to look into various regulatory aspects for stock markets, including the recent Adani Group shares crash triggered by the Hindenburg Research’s fraud allegations.A bench of Chief Justice D Y Chandrachud and Justices P S Narasimha and J B Pardiwala said the panel will make an overall assessment of situation, suggest measures to make investors aware and strengthening of existing regulatory measures for stock markets.The bench also directed the Centre, financial statutory bodies and the SEBI chairperson to render all cooperation to the panel which will have to submit its report within two months.Former judges OP Bhat and JP Devdatt are also part of the probe committee. The court also named Nandan Nilekani, KV Kamath and Somasekharan Sundaresan as three other members of the committee.While reserving its order, the top court on February 17 had refused to accept in a sealed cover the Centre’s suggestion on a proposed panel of experts.Till now four PILs have been filed in the top court on the issue by lawyers M L Sharma, Vishal Tiwari, Congress leader Jaya Thakur and Mukesh Kumar, who claims to be a social activist.Adani Group stocks have taken a beating on the bourses after the Hindenburg Research made a litany of allegations, including fraudulent transactions and share-price manipulation, against the business conglomerate. The Adani Group has dismissed the charges as lies, saying it complies with all laws and disclosure requirements.

Delay in AIBE 17 (XVII) 2023 Result Issue Reaches Supreme Court- Lawyer Files Plea Says Right to Livelihood is in Jeopardy A lawyer has filed a petition with the Supreme Court requesting the Bar Council of India (BCI) to announce the results of the 17th All India Bar Examination (AIBE), which took place in February 2021. The petitioner argues that failure to announce the AIBE results is jeopardizing her legal right to practice as an advocate, which will affect her source of income.  According to the Petitioner, life can be miserable without a livelihood, and article 21 of the Indian Constitution guarantees the right to life as a fundamental right, including the right to livelihood.  The AIBE is a mandatory examination for lawyers to enroll with a State Bar Council and engage in the practice of law. The delay in declaring the AIBE results is unreasonably abusing the BCI’s powers, and the petitioner has asked the Court to instruct the BCI to announce the results as soon as possible.

For SC Advocates Below 45 years of Age Can be Designated as Senior Advocate Only in Exceptional Circumstances On Friday, the Supreme Court passed a detailed judgment on improving the system of designation of Senior Advocates in the Supreme Court and High Courts. A Bench of Justices SK Kaul, Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Aravind Kumar delivered the Judgment in the case of Ms Indira Jai Singh vs Supreme Court of India (M.A. Nos. 709/2022, 1502/2020) The Supreme Court has covered various aspects of the designation such as voting by secret ballot, Cut Off Marks, Points for publication, reported and unreported judgments, pro bono work, the domain expertise of an applicant under various branches of law, age, personal interview and other general aspects. Background ​​The designation of Senior Advocates in India is a prestigious title awarded to exceptional advocates who have made a significant contribution to the legal profession. This title is granted in recognition of an advocate’s standing and achievements in the field, which sets them apart as someone who can offer exceptional service to clients, the judiciary, and the public. The Advocates Act, 1961, provides for the designation of Senior Advocates in India through Section 16, which categorizes advocates into two groups: advocates and Senior Advocates. Under Section 16(2), the Supreme Court and the High Court are authorized to designate an advocate as Senior Advocate, with their consent. In the case of the Supreme Court, this power is provided in Rule 2 of Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013. The system for designating Senior Advocates was challenged when Ms. Indira Jaising, a Senior Advocate herself, filed a writ petition in 2015. She claimed that the existing system was flawed and not transparent or objective, meaning merit and ability were not always taken into account. She called for a permanent selection committee to be established, which would replace the current voting system. In response to this challenge, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court issued an elaborate judgment on October 12, 2017. The judgment put forth a series of guidelines to improve the designation process’s transparency and objectivity while still retaining the Court’s designation power. The guidelines provide for the creation of a Permanent Committee to be chaired by the Chief Justice and two of the most senior judges. The committee would also include the Attorney General/Advocate General of the State in question, with the fifth member being nominated from the Bar by the other members. Age of Advocates for Designation On the issue of age for designation, the Court said:We must also say that the Supreme Court rests on a different footing as the highest court of the land. Although designations in the Supreme Court in comparison to High Courts have usually taken place at the age of 45 plus, younger advocates have also been designated. While we would not like to restrict applications only to advocates who are above 45 years of age, only exceptional advocates should be designated below this age. We say no more and leave this aspect to the wisdom of the Permanent Committee and the Full Court. With respect to younger advocates the Court said: “Young Lawyers are naturally not precluded from applying for designation, particularly as the 2018 Guidelines do not require anything more than ten years of practice. However, we believe that such advocates would have to display that extra bit of ability to be designated.”

Title: Akella Lalita versus Sri Konda Hanumantha Rao Case No.: CA 6325-6326/2015 The Supreme Court recently ruled that a relief for which no pleading or prayer has been made, should not be granted. As per the Bench of Justices Dinesh Maheshwari and Krishna Murari: it is a fact that absolutely no relief was ever sought by them for the change of surname of the child to that of first husband/ son of respondents. It is settled law that relief not found on pleadings should not be granted. If a Court considers or grants a relief for which no prayer or pleading was made depriving the respondent of an opportunity to oppose or resist such relief, it would lead to miscarriage of justice. This observation was made by the court while setting aside an Andhra Pradesh High Court judgement directing a mother to change the surname of her child and to reflect the new husband’s name as a stepfather. In the appeal before the Supreme Court, the main issue raised was whether the High Court was empowered to direct the appellant to change the surname of her child even though the respondent had sought no such relief before the trial court. At the outset, the Apex Court noted that it is well settled that if no reliefs are sought in the pleadings then it cannot be granted and if a court considers or grants such a relief for which no pleading or prayer was made depriving the respondent of the opportunity to resist the same then it would lead to miscarriage of justice. As per the bench, the High Court traversed beyond the pleadings by directing the change of surname of the child and therefore it set aside the impugned order thereby partly allowing the appeal. The court also reiterated that the mother, being the natural guardian of the child, has the right to decide the child’s surname and she also has the right to give up the child for adoption.

Good News For Judicial Officers- Supreme Court Orders Pay Hike From 1 Jan 2016; Arrears to be Paid by 30 June 2023 The Supreme Court on Wednesday ordered the implementation of the enhanced pay scales recommended by the Second National Judicial Pay Commission from January 1, 2016. A bench of Chief Justice of India NV Ramana, Justice Krishna Murari and Justice Hima Kohli directed the Center and states to pay the dues of officers in three instalments: 25% in three months, 25% in three months and the balance amount on June 30. till 2023. The Supreme Court also said that it was important to revise the pay structure immediately as judicial officers were not covered by the pay commissions set up by the state and the Centre. The Supreme Court issued the directions while considering the petition of All India Judges Association for constitution of an All India Judicial Commission to review the service conditions of District Judiciary Judges. On January 6, 2022, the Court held that the two issues pending for consideration were the pay scales for the subordinate judiciary and pension/retirement benefits. The Supreme Court established the second National Judicial Pay Commission in 2017 to review the pay scales and other conditions of judicial officers of subordinate judiciary across the country. Good news for judicial officers- Supreme Court has ordered an increase in salary from January 1, 2016 on the recommendation of the Judicial Commission; Dues will be paid by 30 June 2023

Case Title: Haryana State Industrial And Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd. & Ors. v. MR. Deepak Aggarwal & Ors. Bench: Justices A.M. Khanwilkar, Abhay S. Oka and C.T. Ravikumar Citation: Arising out of SLP(C)Nos.16631-16632/2018 Sec 24 Land Acquisitions Act 2013 | When Land Acquisition Gets Initiated? Explains Supreme Court The Supreme Court on Thursday stated that the acquisitions initiated for public purposes should go on in a fair and transparent manner with a view to achieve the intent and purport of the 2013 Act. The bench of Justices A.M. Khanwilkar, Abhay S. Oka and C.T. Ravikumar stated that “all such procedures and formalities shall be continued till the determination of compensation by applying all the provisions for determination of compensation, under the 2013 Act. A contra-construction, in view of the restrictive application of the provisions to such proceedings during its continuance, would make the provisions under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act unworkable.” In this case, the issue was regarding the meaning and interpretation of the word “initiated” employed in Section 24(1) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 with reference to land acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The question before the bench was: When Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act makes it clear with necessary implication that all provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation alone would be applicable to such proceedings initiated under the L.A. Act but, not culminated in an award, how the procedures are to be regulated during the intervening period till the proceedings reach the stage of determination of compensation? The bench observed that a perusal of Section 24 would reveal that the passing of an Award under Section 11 of the L.A. Act is the key factor in deciding the manner and nature of continuance of the land acquisition proceedings. Supreme Court after referring to various judgments observed that “There cannot be any uncertainty on that aspect. The procedures to be undertaken and the manner in which they are to be regulated cannot remain uncertain. They are conducted either in the manner provided under the L.A. Act or in the manner provided under the 2013 Act. But then, in view of Section 24(1)(a), the provisions relating to the determination of compensation alone can be applied to such proceedings or in other words, there is only a restricted application of the provisions of the 2013 Act in relation to such proceedings.” Join LAW TREND WhatsAPP Group for Legal News Updates-Click to Join The bench stated that for the purposes of subsection (1) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act, the proceedings under the L.A. Act shall be treated as initiated on publication of a notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the L.A. Act. Supreme Court further stated that when Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act is applicable, the proceedings shall continue as per the L.A. Act. However, only for the determination of compensation amount, the provisions of the 2013 Act shall be applied. In view of the above, Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

Title: Mandar Deepak Pawar versus the State of Maharashtra Case No.: CrA 442/2022 While quashing a rape case, the Top Court recently observed that there is a difference between a false promise of marriage and a breach of the promise made in good faith but was not subsequently fulfilled. At the outset, the court noted that the parties were in a consensual relationship from 2009-2011 and even though the victim submitted that the relationship was started on a promise to marry, the complaint was only lodged after three years. It is pertinent to note that the Bombay High Court had dismissed the accused’s petition after observing that rape is an offence against society. As per the Apex Court Bench of Justices SK Kaul and MM Sundresh, the registration of FIR, in this case, is an abuse of the criminal process. The court opined that allowing further proceeding in the case would amount to harassment as the parties chose to get into a physical relationship for considerable and for some reason the relationship did not work out, and the same could have happened even after marriage. While referring to Pramod Suryabhan Pawar versus the State of Maharashtra, the court observed that there is a difference between a false promise of marriage given by the maker and a breach of promise which is made in good faith but is not fulfilled. Therefore, the Bench allowed the petition and quashed the rape case filed against the petitioner-accused.

Case Title: Noor Mohammed v. Khurram Pasha Bench: Justices Uday Umesh Lalit, S. Ravindra Bhat and Sudhanshu Dhulia Citation: Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal)No. 2872 of 2022 Sec 143A NI Act | If Accused has Failed To Deposit Interim Compensation He Can’t Be Denied Right To Cross-Examination: Supreme Court The Supreme Court on Tuesday ruled that an accused who had failed to deposit interim compensation could be fastened with any other disability including denial of the right to cross-examine the witnesses. The bench of Justices Uday Umesh Lalit, S. Ravindra Bhat and Sudhanshu Dhulia stated that “if a statute prescribes a method or modality for the exercise of power, by necessary implication, the other methods of performance are not acceptable.” In this case, an order was passed by the Trial Court directing the Appellant to deposit 20% of the cheque amount as interim compensation in terms of Section 143(A) of the Act within 60 days. The amount was not deposited by the Appellant. An application was made on behalf of the Appellant under Section 145(2) of the Act seeking permission to cross-examine the Respondent. The complaint Case was accepted by the Trial Court finding the Appellant guilty under Section 138 of the Act. The appellant court and Karnataka HC upheld the order passed by the trial court. Mr. Shailesh Madiyal, Counsel for the appellant submitted that in case the order of interim compensation as directed in terms of Section 143A of the Act is not complied with, the amount can be recovered in terms of Sub-Section 5 of said Section 143A as if it were a fine under Section 421 of the Code, but it would not be within the competence of the court to deprive an accused of his right to cross-examine a witness. Mr. Anand Nuli, Counsel for the respondent submitted that orders passed by the courts below were consistent with the mandate of Section 143A and the right to cross-examine was rightly closed by the courts below. The issue for consideration before the bench was: Whether the accused can be denied the right to cross-examine if he has failed to deposit interim compensation? Supreme Court opined that the method and modality of recovery of interim compensation is clearly delineated by the Legislature. It is a well-known principle that if a statute prescribes a method or modality for the exercise of power, by necessary implication, the other methods of performance are not acceptable. The bench stated that “The concerned provision nowhere contemplates that an accused who had failed to deposit interim compensation could be fastened with any other disability including denial of the right to cross-examine the witnesses examined on behalf of the complainant. Any such order foreclosing the right would not be within the powers conferred upon the court and would, as a matter of fact, go well beyond the permissible exercise of power.” In view of the above, The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and directed to permit the Appellant to cross-examine the Respondent and then take the proceedings to a logical conclusion.

The Bar Council of India (BCI) submitted before the Supreme Court on Tuesday that law graduates working in other professions do not need to resign from their jobs in order to be enrolled as lawyers, adding that such people will be given a six-month window to quit their jobs after passing the enrolment examination. The BCI’s general council made the decision on July 8 and conveyed it to the court in an affidavit filed last week, in a case where the Supreme Court is considering a slew of reforms to the enrolment process. The Supreme Court was hearing an appeal filed by BCI against a Gujarat high court decision in November 2020 that allowed a single mother to take the All India Bar Examination (AIBE) while continuing to work. According to the BCI rules, anyone who wishes to take the AIBE must first resign from their job and fill out the enrolment form. The Supreme Court, too, criticised the BCI’s regulations, suggesting on April 21 that a person taking the exam be allowed to resign within a certain time period after passing the AIBE. The BCI stated in its most recent affidavit, filed through advocate Durga Dutt, that “the Council has accepted the suggestions made by this Court and has resolved that every State Bar Council shall have three registers – A, B, and C.” It went on to say that ‘Register B’ will contain the names of candidates who are already employed somewhere and will be allowed to take the AIBE if they promise to leave their job within six months of passing the exam. The Certificate of Practice, which is required for any legal practitioner, will be issued only after such individuals have left their employment, according to the BCI. The other two categories in Register A and C did not concern the court because the first contained names of people who were not employed elsewhere; the third category will include people who were enrolled but later had their licence suspended in order to pursue other jobs or professions. Concerning the third category, the BCI stated that such individuals who have been in some other employment for five years or more since the announcement of the AIBE results will be required to retake the enrolment test if they decide to rejoin the legal profession. This rule, however, does not apply to people who stop practising but work in jobs related to the legal profession, such as public prosecutors, assistant public prosecutors, judicial service, or as law officers in corporate or government offices. The suggestion to provide separate categorisation of persons in employment who take the AIBE was made to the Supreme Court by amicus curiae and senior advocate KV Vishwanathan, who realised that the bar on taking up any other profession should apply only when practising law and not when taking the test. Vishwanathan told the Supreme Court that the BCI affidavit is largely acceptable, with minor changes suggested. The bench of justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul, S Ravindra Bhat, and MM Sundresh took the affidavit on record and scheduled the matter for further consideration on September 27 to look into other aspects of the AIBE examination pattern and the conduct of surprise inspections of law colleges to ensure education standards are maintained. In this regard, the BCI stated in its affidavit that an agency to conduct the examination will be chosen by a committee led by a former Supreme Court judge. This committee will also look into the best way to assess the skill and knowledge of law graduates taking AIBE, focusing on their analytical thinking process rather than rote ability. This year’s AIBE cycle will take place in September and October.

Case Title: Siddharth Mukesh Bhandari v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. Bench: Justices M.R. Shah and B.V. Nagarathna Citation: CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1044 OF 2022 The Supreme Court on Tuesday reiterated that grant of any stay of investigation and/or any interim relief while exercising powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would be only in the rarest of rare cases. The bench of Justices M.R. Shah and B.V. Nagarathna was dealing with the appeal filed challenging the judgment passed by the High Court of Gujarat where the High Court while admitting the special criminal applications has granted the interim relief and has stayed the further proceedings of respective criminal inquiry cases against the respondents. Shri Harshit Tolia, Counsel for the appellant submitted that It appears that at every stage, the investigation has been stalled. It can also be seen that the investigation has been stalled earlier and even thereafter pursuant to the impugned order, which cannot be said to be in the interest of the prosecution and/or investigating agency. The issue for consideration before the bench was: Whether the judgment passed by the High Court granting the interim relief to the respondents in accordance with law or not? Supreme Court observed that Nothing is on record to show that thereafter any further proceedings were initiated by the respondents seeking anticipatory bail. The bench relied upon the case of M/s. Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors where it was held that “grant of any stay of investigation and/or any interim relief while exercising powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would be only in the rarest of rare cases.” In this case, the Court had also emphasized the right of the Investigating Officer to investigate the criminal proceedings. Supreme Court observed that the “High Court has not properly appreciated or considered the earlier judgment passed in M/s. Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Even the learned Single Judge has also not properly understood the ratio of the decision of this Court in the case of M/s. Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.” In view of the above, The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court.

No consensus could be reached during the 75-minute Supreme Court collegium meetingNo consensus could be reached during the 75-minute Supreme Court collegium meeting No consensus could be reached during the 75-minute Supreme Court collegium meeting In an unusual occurrence, a 75-minute Collegium meeting on Tuesday involving CJI N V Ramana and Justices U U Lalit, D Y Chandrachud, Sanjay K Kaul, and S Abdul Nazeer failed to reach agreement on filling three vacancies in the Supreme Court or appointing or transferring HC Chief Justices, reports TOI. Because there had been no prior notification that courts 1–5 would not be sitting at 10.30 a.m. due to a Collegium meeting, waiting lawyers speculated as to why the meeting was taking so long. The Collegium meetings, which are usually held after a prior discussion among judges, are usually over in 10 to 15 minutes. The meeting was tense because the law ministry had delayed writing to CJI Ramana to seek recommendation of Justice Lalit’s name as the next CJI. Traditionally, the ministry writes the letter a month before the incumbent CJI’s retirement, and the CJI sends the recommendation to the ministry 30 days before his retirement. The collegium also discussed the names of certain HC chief justices for elevation to the SC to fill the three vacancies created by the retirements of Justices Vineet Saran, L N Rao, and A M Khanwilkar. CJI Ramana, who retires on August 26, also brought the vacancies for Chief Justices of High Courts before the Collegium. There was a stalemate over the selection of HC judges for those posts, as well as the issue of transferring incumbent CJs from one HC to another, due to the diverse views expressed by members. The Collegium is expected to meet again on Wednesday to try to break the deadlock over selection issues, which was clouded on Tuesday by an unrelated development – the law ministry’s delay in seeking the CJI’s recommendation for his successor. Justice Lalit will be sworn in as the 49th Chief Justice of India on August 27 and will serve for only 74 days. As Chief Justice, Justice Lalit would preside over a Collegium that included Justices Chandrachud, Kaul, Nazeer, and Indira Banerjee. With the retirement of Justice Banerjee on September 23, Justice K M Joseph will join the Collegium. On November 8, Justice Lalit will step down as Chief Justice of India. According to the convention, he must write to the government on October 8 recommending Justice Chandrachud as the 50th CJI. Whatever vacancies and transfers are to be filled during Justice Lalit’s tenure as CJI, they must be completed within 42 days, between August 27 and October 7.

Chief Justice of India NV Ramana has written to the Union Government recommending Justice Uday Umesh Lalit, the Supreme Court’s second senior judge, as the next Chief Justice of India. CJI Ramana will step down on August 26th. Kiren Rijiju, Union Minister of Law and Justice, recently wrote to the CJI, requesting that he name the successor. If confirmed, Justice Lalit will be the second CJI to be directly elevated from the Bar to the Supreme Court Bench, following Justice S M Sikri, who became the 13th CJI in January 1971. Justice Lalit, who is from Maharashtra, will serve as the 49th Chief Justice of India for a little less than three months, retiring on November 8, 2022. Justice Lalit was a Senior Advocate at the Supreme Court before being appointed as a judge on August 13, 2014. His father, Justice UR Lalit, was a senior advocate and a Delhi High Court judge Justice Lalit was among the majority of the Constitution Bench judges who ruled that Triple Talaq was unconstitutional. He also presided over the bench that ordered the Travancore Royal Family to hand over administration of the Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple to a Court-appointed administrative committee. Last year, a bench led by him overturned the Bombay High Court’s contentious “skin-to-skin” decision, ruling that any physical contact with a minor with sexual intent is an offence under POCSO even if there is no direct contact with skin. Justice Lalit, who was born on November 9, 1957, became an advocate in June 1983 and practised in the Bombay High Court until December 1985. In January 1986, he relocated his practise to Delhi. From 1986 to 1992, he worked for former Attorney-General Soli J. Sorabjee. The Supreme Court designated him as a senior advocate in April 2004.

The Bar Council of India has informed the Supreme Court that law graduates who have been out of practise for more than five years and wish to return to advocacy must pass the All India Bar Examination. The bar body stated in an affidavit filed in the Supreme Court that if a person takes up a job that has nothing to do with legal or judicial matters, that person will have to reappear for the AIBE exam. “If a person remains in service with no connection/relationship with legal or judicial matters,” the affidavit stated, “then such candidate shall be required to clear the AIBE again if he/she decides to get his/her licence to practise revived after remaining in the job for more than five years from the date of publication of his/her AIBE result.” The Supreme Court was hearing an appeal filed by the BCI challenging a decision of the Gujarat High Court allowing people with other jobs to enroll as advocates without resigning.

Title: State of HP versus HP Aluminium & Conductors Case No.: Civil Appeal No.: 5032/2022 The Supreme Court has set aside a Himachal Pradesh High Court judgement after opining that the High Court verdict is utterly incomprehensible. The respondents in the case had challenged the validity of orders of reassessment passed by the State government. However, the High Court set aside the assessment and an appeal was filed in the Apex Court. Therefore, the Apex Court set aside the High Court judgement and directed the High Court to consider the matter afresh. When the Supreme Court took up the case, it remarked that the High Court judgement is utterly incomprehensible and the court cannot discern the reason to set aside the judgement. The order was passed by the Bench of Justices DY Chandrachud and Sudhanshu Dhulia while dealing with an appeal filed by the State of Himachal Pradesh against the High Court order wherein it had allowed the petitions filed by respondents under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution. It is pertinent to note that in the past as well, the Supreme Court has expressed displeasure over some incoherent and incomprehensible judgements passed by the Himachal Pradesh High Court.

Case Title: Reliance Industries Limited v. Securities And Exchange Board Of India & Ors. Bench: CJI. N.V. Ramana and Justices J.K. Maheshwari and Hima Kohli Citation: CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1167 of 2022 The Supreme Court on Friday stated that, SEBI could not have claimed privilege over certain parts of the documents and at the same time, agreeing to disclose some part. Such selective disclosure cannot be countenanced in law as it clearly amounts to cherry-picking. The bench of CJI. N.V. Ramana and Justices J.K. Maheshwari and Hima Kohli stated that “Initiation of criminal action in commercial transactions, should take place with a lot of circumspection and the Courts ought to act as gate keepers for the same.” In this case, A complaint was filed by one Shri S. Gurumurthy, with the SEBI against Reliance Industries Ltd., its associate companies and its directors, alleging that they fraudulently allotted 12 crore equity shares of RIL to entities purportedly connected with the promoters of RIL, which were funded by RIL and other group companies in 1994. It was alleged that the company and its directors were in violation of Section 77 of the Companies Act, 1956. Mr. Harish Salve, Counsel for the appellant submitted that, the challenge to the maintainability of the present appeal is misconceived. He stated that the interim application filed for seeking documents was argued at length before the High Court, which was ultimately not considered. Mr. Arvind Datar, Counsel for the respondents submitted that, present appeal is not maintainable as there is no criminal complaint pending as on this date. The appellant cannot seek documents in a criminal revision against dismissal of the complaint on the ground of limitation. The issue for consideration before the bench were: 1. Whether this appeal is maintainable? 2.Whether SEBI is required to disclose documents in the present set of proceedings? While dealing with the first issue Supreme Court stated that “Initiation of criminal action in commercial transactions, should take place with a lot of circumspection and the Courts ought to act as gate keepers for the same. Initiating frivolous criminal actions against large corporations, would give rise to adverse economic consequences for the country in the long run. Therefore, the Regulator must be cautious in initiating such an action and carefully weigh each factor.” While dealing with the second issue Supreme Court opined that “It is a matter of record that subsequently, the settlement proceedings were terminated by SEBI and thereafter SEBI has decided to initiate a criminal complaint against the appellant herein. In this context, the objection of SEBI that the issue of disclosure of documents is res judicata as the same was disallowed by the High Court in the earlier round of litigation, cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.” Supreme Court found that SEBI could not have claimed privilege over certain parts of the documents and at the same time, agreeing to disclose some part. Such selective disclosure cannot be countenanced in law as it clearly amounts to cherry-picking. In view of the above, The Supreme Court allowed the appeal.

The syllabus for AIBE17 will be published within 15 days and the exam will be conducted within three months. Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Justice S. Ravindra Bhat and Justice M.M. Sundaresh was hearing the Bar Council of India's challenge to the Gujarat High Court ruling, which allowed people with other jobs, whether full-time or part-time, to enroll as advocates without resigning. In the above proceedings, the Court has issued orders on a regular basis to improve the quality of legal education in India, to remove the shortcomings of bar examination and to examine the idea of ​​chamber placement for young lawyers. The Bar Council has been directed to file an affidavit in this regard so as to apprise the Court of the steps taken to realize its vision. According to the most recent affidavit, the Bar Council passed a resolution to give 6 months time to law graduates after the result of the All India Bar Examination to enroll as an advocate

Case Title: Vikramjit Kakati Vs State of Assam Bench: Justices Ajay Rastogi and Ct. Ravi Kumar Citation: CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s). 1140 OF 2022 The Supreme Court on Thursday said that there is no sufficient evidence to prove that the appellant was present at the time of the murder and hence he is discharged. Justice Ajay Rastogi and Justice C.T. Ravikumar submitted that there is no evidence which in any way links the present appellant to the commission of the offence. In this case, an FIR was lodged on behalf of the mother of the deceased that her son was burnt to death under suspicious circumstances in her rented house. The police filed a charge sheet against the deceased's wife, mother and the appellant three persons under Section 302/120B/201/118 of the IPC. The only allegation against the appellant was that he, in conspiracy with other accused, removed the evidence of the offense from the place where the alleged offense was committed. The appellant has filed an appeal against the order of the Gauhati High Court dismissing the discharge application filed by the appellant under section 227 CrPC. Appellant's counsel submitted that the trial judge was required to at least examine the existence of prima facie material with respect to the appellant's involvement in the commission of the offense or existence of serious doubt against him and when there is no prima facie material of suspicion So what to say about serious suspicion, the charge cannot be framed. Counsel for the respondent submitted that there is sufficient evidence against the appellant to suspect the commission of an offense and only after examining the charge sheet and other material available on record, the charges have been framed by the learned Trial Judge. The issue of consideration before the bench was: Whether the order of the Gauhati High Court dismissing the application for discharge filed by the appellant was valid or not? The Supreme Court said that the investigating officer has not even brought prima facie material in the charge sheet as to what was the motive of the appellant to commit the alleged offence. The bench observed that “there is no evidence which in any way links the present appellant to the commission of the offense and neither the trial court nor the High Court has attempted to peruse the record to see whether any offense is committed or not. . Any oral/documentary evidence which in any way links the appellant to the alleged occurrence of the offense and, even in the absence of a prima facie material, oral/documentary, is being put on the charge sheet by the prosecution, the trial The Court as well as the High Court has committed a grave error in framing the charge against the appellant. Even the complainant has not mentioned the name of the appellant as the offender in the complaint, but has stated that he suspects malpractices. In view of the above, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal.

Title: Ravjot Singh Vs Bar Council of India On Friday, the Supreme Court granted liberty to withdraw a petition seeking a direction to the Bar Council of India to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a senior advocate for professional misconduct under the Advocates Act 1961. A bench of Justices UU Lalit, Sudhanshu Dhulia and Ravindra Bhat granted liberty to the petitioner to withdraw the matter. The court had questioned the petitioner as to why did he approach the High Court when the appellate authority in this matter is the Bar Council of India. Before the court, the petitioner submitted that the BCI and the Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana have refused to go against Section 5 of the Advocates Act 1961, under Senior Counsel. There is an allegation of felony conduct against the senior counsel for filing a fraud report of a handwriting expert before the apex court in an SLP. Owing to the fraud report, the apex court had in 2005 quashed the SLP filed by the father of the present petitioner. Since the court was dissatisfied with the reply of the counsel, it sought the permission of the court to withdraw the case.

President appoints Justice UU Lalit as 49th Chief Justice of India On Wednesday, the Ministry of Law and Justice notified the appointment of Justice Uday Umesh Lalit as the 49th Chief Justice of India. The notification states: In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (2) of Article 124 of the Constitution of India, the President, Shri Justice Uday Umesh Lalit, is pleased to appoint a Judge of the Supreme Court as the Chief Justice of India with effect from 27 August 2022. About Justice UU Lalita Justice Lalit was born on 9 November 1957. In June 1983, he was enrolled as a lawyer. Till December 1985, he practiced at the High Court of Bombay. In January 1986, he shifted his practice to Delhi. The Supreme Court appointed him as Senior Advocate in April 2004. Under the directions of the Supreme Court, a Special Public Prosecutor was appointed for the CBI to conduct trials in all 2G cases. For two terms, he served on the Supreme Court of India's Legal Services Committee. On 13 August 2014, he was appointed to the Supreme Court of India.He will retire on 8 November 2022.

On Wednesday, the Supreme Court transferred all FIRs against the suspended BJP spokesperson for provocative speeches to the Delhi Police. The order was passed by a special bench of Justice Surya Kant and Justice Pardiwala. It also said that protection from arrest to Nupur Sharma will continue in all pending and future FIRs relating to her statement on Prophet Mohammad during a TV debate in May. The Supreme Court has allowed Nupur Sharma to move the Delhi High Court for quashing or lodging of an FIR lodged for alleged blasphemy at any place in India. The SC said that all FIRs to be registered in future will also be transferred to the Special Cell of Delhi Police, which will investigate them. The Supreme Court also refused to accept West Bengal's plea for a court-monitored joint SIT probe.

According to a report released by computer security software company McAfee, 85 percent of children in India have reported cyberbullying as well as someone cyberbullying. The India-focused findings are part of the company's global report 'Cyberbullying in Plain Sight, a survey of 10 countries. It was held from June 15 to July 5, involving 11,687 parents and their children. McAfee also claimed that the survey uncovered a shocking fact - that many children participate in cyberbullying, which is their behavior without realizing what it is, while parents struggle to keep up with it. McAfee said, “Cyberbullying in India reaches alarming heights as more than 1 in 3 children by the age of 10 face threats of cyber racism, sexual harassment, and physical harm – making India one of the world’s leading cyberbullying countries. It becomes the number 1 country." The report said, 45 percent of these children said they hid their experiences of cyberbullying from their parents, perhaps due to the relative absence of interaction. All parents must also understand modern-day cyberbullying, and how dangerous it is for their children.

SOVA was earlier focusing on countries like US, Russia, and Spain, but in July 2022 it added several other countries including India to its list of targets. The new mobile banking 'Trojan' virus - SOVA - that can secretly encrypt an Android phone for ransom and is difficult to uninstall, is targeting Indian customers. India's federal cyber security agency issued an advisory saying that the virus has upgraded to its fifth version after it was first detected in Indian cyberspace in July."It has been reported to CERT-In that Indian banking customers are being targeted by a new type of mobile banking malware campaign using SOVA Android Trojan. The first version of this malware appeared for sale in underground markets in September 2021 with the ability to harvest user names and passwords via keylogging, stealing cookies, and adding false overlays to a range of apps," the advisory said. Here's all you need to know about the SOVA virus SOVA can add false overlays to a range of apps and "mimic" over 200 banking and payment applications in order to con the Android user The latest version of this malware hides within fake Android applications that show up with the logo of a few famous legitimate apps like Chrome, Amazon, NFT (non-fungible token linked to cryptocurrency) platform to deceive users into installing them. The Indian Computer Emergency Response Team or CERT-In is the federal technology arm to combat cyber attacks and guards the Internet space against phishing and hacking assaults and similar online attacks. The agency said the malware is distributed via smishing (phishing via SMS) attacks, like most Android banking Trojans. The lethality of the virus can be gauged from the fact that it can collect keystrokes, steal cookies, intercept multi-factor authentication (MFA) tokens, take screenshots and record video from a webcam and can perform gestures like screen click, swipe etc. using android accessibility service. Another key feature of the virus, according to the advisory, is the refactoring of its "protections" module, which aims to protect itself from different victim actions. For example, it said, if the user tries to uninstall the malware from the settings or pressing the icon, SOVA is able to intercept these actions and prevent them by returning to the home screen and showing a toast (small popup) displaying "This app is secured". It can jeopardize the privacy and security of sensitive customer data and result in "large-scale" attacks and financial frauds. How does it work As per the advisory, once the fake android application is installed on the phone, it sends the list of all applications installed on the device to the C2 (command and control server) controlled by the threat actor in order to obtain the list of targeted applications. "At this point, the C2 sends back to the malware the list of addresses for each targeted application and stores this information inside an XML file. These targeted applications are then managed through the communications between the malware and the C2," it said. How to protect your Android devce: The CERT-In suggested some counter-measures and best practices that can be put into action by the users to keep safe from the virus. Users should reduce the risk of downloading potentially harmful apps by limiting their download sources to official app stores, such as your device's manufacturer or operating system app store, they should always review the app details, number of downloads, user reviews, comments and "ADDITIONAL INFORMATION" section, it said. One should also verify app permissions and grant only those which have relevant context for the app's purpose. They should install regular Android updates and patches and not browse un-trusted websites or follow un-trusted links and exercise caution while clicking on the link provided in any unsolicited emails and SMSs.

The Supreme Court on Friday took exception to a judge sentencing a convict to death in a POCSO case in a trial completed within 4 days and sentencing

Supreme Court The Supreme Court observed that an FIR under Section 306 IPC (abetment of suicide) cannot be quashed under Section 482 CrPC on the basis of settlement. High Courts Cannot Quash Abetment to Suicide Case Based on Compromise With the Deceased’s Relatives. The Supreme Court ruled on Friday that criminal proceedings in serious crimes such as abetting suicide cannot be quashed by High Courts based solely on a financial settlement between the accused and the deceased person A Bench of Justices Indira Banerjee and V Ramasubramanian reasoned that offences such as attempted murder and aiding and abetting suicide are crimes against society as a whole, not just an individual. “An FIR under Section 306 of the IPC (suicide attempt) cannot even be quashed on the basis of any financial settlement with the informant, surviving spouse, parents, children, guardians, caregivers, or anyone else,” the Court ruled. The appellant in this case was the wife of a deceased suicide victim. The accused allegedly defrauded the husband of a large sum of money, leaving the deceased in financial distress. The Gujarat High Court had quashed the first information report against the accused, citing a settlement between the accused and the deceased’s purported cousin, who was also the original complainant. Furthermore, the wife’s request for a recall of that order for not being heard while quashing the FIR was denied, giving rise to the current appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court noted that the High Court had not stated whether it had jurisdiction to dismiss a criminal complaint in a suicide case, which was also a non-compoundable offence, based on settlement between the parties. The Bench emphasised that in criminal law, a complainant’s position is that of an informant who is entitled to a hearing, not one who can withdraw a complaint against a serious offender. The Court also stated that hearing a cousin of the deceased does not waive the requirement to hear the deceased’s wife. “The wife of the deceased would have a greater interest than cousins and employees in prosecuting accused persons charged with abetting her husband’s suicide,” the Court stated. The Supreme Court reasoned that the crime of aiding suicide is one of crimes against society, and a complaint in this regard cannot be dismissed based on compromises. “Heinous or serious crimes that are not private in nature and have a significant impact on society cannot be averted through a compromise between the offender and the complainant and/or the victim. Murder, rape, burglary, dacoity, and even aiding and abetting suicide are not private or civil offences. Such offences are against society.” In this regard, the court relied on its decision in Laxmi Narayan, in which the offence of attempted murder was not quashed. The Bench explained how the High Court’s order could set a dangerous precedent by allowing complaints to be filed for oblique reasons in order to extract money from the accused. “Furthermore, financially strong offenders would go free, even in cases of grave and serious offences such as murder, rape, bride burning, and so on,” the Court added. As a result, it granted the appeal and held that the criminal proceedings could not have been stopped by the High Court.

Supreme Court On Wednesday, the Supreme Court upheld the provisions of PMLA (Prevention of Money Laundering Act) that relate to the power to arrest/attachment/and seizure which are conferred on the Enforcement Directorate. The Apex Court upheld the Constitutional validity of provisions of Section 5,8,15,17 and 19 of PMLA that deal with the EDs power of arrest, attachment, search and seizure. The court also upheld the reverse burden of proof u.s 24 of the Act after opining that the provision has a reasonable nexus with the objectives of the Act. The Court also affirmed the twin conditions of bail in Section 45 of the PMLA Act and observed that the Parliament is competent to amend the provisions in 2018 even though the Top Court had struck down the twin conditions in Nikesh Tarachand judgement. The twin conditions for bail were: (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release; and (ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Join LAW TREND WhatsAPP Group for Legal News Updates-Click to Join The court also upheld that ED officials are not police officials and therefore any statements recorded by them u.s 50 of the Act will not be hit by Article 20(3) of the Indian Constitution that gives a right against self-incrimination. As per the Court, Section 50 procedure is an inquiry and not an investigation. As per the court, ECIR (Enforcement Case Information Report) cannot be equated to an FIR and so CrPC provisions related to FIR will not apply to ECIR. the court also opined that supplying ECIR is not mandatory and the disclosure for the grounds of arrest is sufficient. The court clarified that when a person is before the court it can ask for records. Arguments of the petitioner that the offence of money laundering u.s 3 of the Act will only apply if the projected property is untainted, were also rejected by the court and it opined that Section 3 has a wider reach and observed that mere possession of proceeds of crime can be considered money laundering. Significantly, the Bench of Justices AM Khanwilkar, Dinesh Maheshwari and CT Ravikumar directed the Central Government to fill up vacancies in the PMLA Appellate Court. The court has also left open the issue of whether amendments made to PMLA in 2018 could have been done through the Finance Act? This issue will be decided by a seven-judge bench.

A video went viral on social media on Sunday in which a woman can be seen abusing two security guards and calling a security guard "Bihari" and using other obscene language. Later it was found that the video is from Noida, UP and the woman is a lawyer working in DSK Legal Law Firm. A woman lawyer (Bhavya Roy) has been arrested and kept in judicial custody for 14 days for misbehaving with the security guards at her Noida residential society. Reportedly, Roy, who was intoxicated at the time of the incident, was also seen assaulting the security guards and it was claimed that three girls had filed a complaint against the security guard. According to reports, the woman lawyer has been accused of sections 153, 323 and 504, 506 of the IPC.

Case Title: Jameel Ahmed. v. Chhattisgarh State Bench: Justice Deepak Kumar Tiwari Recently, the Chhattisgarh High Court ruled that merely possessing obscene cassettes does not constitute an offence. A bench of Justice Deepak Kumar Tiwari was considering an appeal challenging the judgment passed by the Special Judge, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, under which the appellant was convicted of offenses under sections 292 and 293 IPC. was ordained. In this case the appellant's shop was running and 99 cassettes were recovered from the said shop. The appellant was involved in the activity of taking objectionable photographs of local women/girls. The confiscated cassettes contained pornographic films. A case of offense has also been registered under IPC section 376. It was found that the confiscated cassettes contained obscene films, offenses under sections 292 and 293 of the IPC were added. The trial court convicted the appellant under sections 292 and 293. The issue of consideration before the bench was: Whether the petitioner is liable for offense under sections 292 and 293 of IPC? The High Court relied on the case of Sarat Babu Digumarty vs Sarkar (NCT Delhi) and observed that electronically generated activities which may be obscene are specifically punishable under section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000, and not That under section 292 of IPC. The bench observed that except the recovery of the cassette, there is no material available on record to show that the accused committed the acts mentioned under sections 2(a) to 2(e) of section 292 of the IPC. Mere possession of obscene cassettes cannot amount to an offense and the prosecution has utterly failed to provide any evidence to the effect that possession was found for the purpose of lending it." In view of the above, the bench allowed the appeal.

If you have not verified yourself after filing ITR, then your ITR will be considered incomplete. Earlier, 120 days were available for e-verification, which has now been reduced to 30 days. If you are going to file your ITR ie Income Tax Return this month, then there is an important news for you. Let us tell you that 31 July 2022 was the last date to file ITR. After that you will have to pay a fine of Rs 5000 for filing ITR. ITR can be filed with penalty till 31st December. Apart from this, along with filling ITR, it is also necessary to verify it.

Justice UU Lalit, the CJI-nominated, has made three major announcements regarding reforms during his 74-day tenure as the next Chief Justice of India. Speaking at the farewell function organized by SCBA (Supreme Court Bar Association) for outgoing CJI NV Ramana, Justice UU Lalit made the following announcements:- More transparency in the listing system. A system will be put in place to independently mention the instant list of cases. Efforts will be made that the Constitution Bench should function throughout the year. Justice UU Lalit began his address by saying that he cannot match the popularity of Justice Ramana. He also mentioned the two major achievements of CJI Ramana, clearing judicial vacancies and the importance given to judicial infrastructure. Justice UU Lalit pointed out that the efforts made by CJI Ramana and the National Legal Services Authority to set up legal aid defense lawyers in all districts are now visible. Significantly, Justice Lalit will be the 49th Chief Justice of India and he will take oath on August 27.

BIG Change in Legal Profession: Foreign Lawyers and Law Firms Can Now Practise in India- BCI Notifies Rules The Bar Council of India (BCI) has agreed to open up law practise in India to foreign lawyers, foreign law firms. The statutory body of lawyers has issued guidelines for the registration of foreign lawyers and law firms in India. Foreign lawyer or foreign law firms shall not be entitled to practice in India unless registered with Bar Council of India. The Registration fees is USD 50,000 and Renewal fees is USD 20,000. Foreign Lawyers or Law Firms will be entitled to engage and procure legal expertise/advise of one or more Indian Advocates Registered as foreign lawyers. The most recent rules allow foreign lawyers and law firms to practise international law and international arbitration in India. The rules are based on the “principle of reciprocity in a well-defined, regulated, and controlled manner,” according to the BCI notification. In a notification, the Bar Council of India said, “Opening up of law practise in India to foreign lawyers in the field of practise of foreign law; diverse international legal issues in non-litigious matters and in international arbitration cases would go a long way in helping legal profession/domain grow in India to the benefit of lawyers in India too”. The apex body also stated that if done in a limited, well-controlled, and regulated manner, the move will have no impact on legal practise in India. The Bar Council of India initially opposed the entry of foreign lawyers and law firms into India in any form. However, it was authorised by the legal fraternity of the Country in the years 2007-2014 in Joint Consultative Conferences between BCI, State Bar Councils across the country and other stakeholders to explore the potential and prospects of opening the law practise in India to foreign lawyers.